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NOTE
ESTOPPEL AND IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSES TO
CIVIL BLUE SKY LAW ACTIONS
Every state has enacted statutes that attempt to protect the investing public from fraudulent and deceptive practices in the trans'2
fer of securities.' These laws, often called "blue sky laws,"
emerged in response to concerns that security trading is a business
" 'in which opportunities for dishonesty are of constant occurrence
and ever present.' "3
I ALA. CODE §§ 8-6-1 to -60 (1984 & Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010-.270
(1986 & Supp. 1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1801 to -2041 (1987); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-42-101 to -508 (1987); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25706 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51-101 to -129 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-470 to -502 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 7301-7328
(1975 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.011-.32 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-5-1 to -24 (1982 & Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 485-1 to -25
(1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1401 to -1458 (1980 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.1-.16 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 23-2-1-1 to -24 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.101-.612 (West
Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1252 to -1275 (1981 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 292.310-.991 (Baldwin 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:701-:724 (West 1987);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10101-10710 (Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 11-101 to -805 (1985 & Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I10A, §§ 101-417
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.501-.818 (West 1967
& Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80A.01-.31 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 75-71-101-735 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.101-.419 (Vernon 1979 &
Supp. 1988); MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-101 to -308 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1101
to -1124 (1983 & Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.220-.970 (Michie Supp.
1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-B:1 to -B:34 (1983 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 49:3-47 to -76 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13B-1 to -56
(1986); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 352 to 359-h (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -65 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-04-01 to -19 (1976 & Supp.
1983); Onio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01-.99 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1-502 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.005-.995
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to -704 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 7-11-1 to -30 (1985 & Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (Law. Coop. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 47-31-1 to -147 (1983 & Supp. 1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-2-101 to -201 (1984 & Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
581-1 to -40 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1986 &
Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4201-4241 (1984 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-501 to -527.3 (1985 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.005-.940
(1978 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 32-1-101 to -4-418 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 551.01-.67 (West 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-4-101 to -130 (1987).
2 The name "blue sky" derives from the practices of persons who were so fraudulent "that it was stated that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple."
L. Loss & E. COWErr, BLUE SKY LAw 7 n.22 (1958).
3
Id. at 3 (quoting Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
767 (1943)).
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The majority of blue sky laws contain civil liability provisions.
The effectiveness of these blue sky laws depends upon their civil
liability provisions because, although such laws contain penal provisions, uneven state enforcement and inadequate enforcement budg-

ets make civil remedies the most effective deterrent to securities
4

fraud.
Defendants in civil blue sky law actions have attempted to insu-

late themselves from liability by pleading the defenses of estoppel
and in pari delicto. Some courts, however, refuse to allow these defenses in blue sky law actions. This Note analyzes the applicability
of these two defenses to civil blue sky law actions and argues that
courts should allow the defense of in pari delicto but not the defense of estoppel. By allowing only the defense of in pari delicto,
courts will provide maximum protection for the investing public.
I
THE BLUE SKY LAWS' CIVIL LIABILrrY PROVISIONS

A.

The Uniform Securities Act

In an attempt to standardize the blue sky laws of the individual
states, 5 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.6 Currently, thirty-four states have adopted all or substantial portions of
the Act.

7

4 "The inadequate budgets and uneven enforcement of the blue sky laws make
civil liability the only really effective sanction in many states-perhaps most states." L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1631 (2d ed. 1961).
5 UNIF. SECURITIEs Acr § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1958). This section states:
This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make

uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this act with the related federal
regulation.

id-

6

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved

the Uniform Securities Act on August 25, 1956. UNIF. SECURITIEs ACT prefatory note,
7B U.L.A. 510 (1958), reprintedin L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES

ACT 5 (1976).
7 The following jurisdictions have adopted all or substantially all of the Uniform
Securities Act of 1956: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, NewJersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto
Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 7B U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1988); 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
5500
(1985).
In 1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-

proved the Uniform Securities Act of 1985 (1985 Act), which supercedes the Uniform
Securities Act of 1956 (1956 Act). Because only three states have substantially adopted
the 1985 Act, 7B U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 1988), and because, for purposes of this Note, the
1985 Act is very similar to the 1956 Act, this Note only focuses on the 1956 Act. Herein-
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The Uniform Securities Act imposes civil liability on sellers8
who violate certain registration and disclosure requirements or
commit fraud in the offer or sale of a security.9 Sellers face liability
under the act if they fail to register as sellers,1 0 fail to register the
securities,"I represent to a purchaser that the securities' registration
after, the "Uniform Securities Act" refers to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956. The
three states that have adopted the 1985 Act are Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§§ 10101-10710 (Supp. 1986), Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.220-.970 (Michie
Supp. 1987), and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13B-1 to -56 (1986).
8 Throughout this Note, "seller" refers to any person who sells or offers to sell a
security, "purchaser" refers to any person who purchases a security, and "sale" refers to
a sale or an offer to sell a security.
9 Section 410(a) of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 provides:
(a) Any person who
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 201(a), 301, or
405(b), or any rule or order under section 403 which requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used, or of any condition imposed under section 304(d), 305(g), or 305(h), or
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or
omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid
for the security, together with interest at six percent per year from the
date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of
any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or
for damages if he no longer owns the security.
UNIF. SECURrrIEs ACT § 410(a), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1958).
Currently, thirty-three of the states that have adopted the Uniform Securities Act
have adopted some form of section 410. See ALA. CODE § 8-16-19 (1984); ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.220 (1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-106 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125
(1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-498 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 7323 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 30-1446 (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-19
(Burns 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268 (Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.480
(Baldwin 1987); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703 (1985 & Supp. 1987); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. I OA, § 410 (Law. Co-op. 1985); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 451.810
(West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.23 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 75-71-717 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.411 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-10-307 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1118 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421-B:25 (1983 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71 (West Supp. 1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 78A-56 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408 (West 1987); OR. REV.
STAT. § 59.115 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-1490 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-122 (1984); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22 (1986);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430 (Supp.
1987); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-410 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59 (West 1986); Wyo.
STAT. § 17-4-122 (1987). Many of these statutes contain modifications of, additions to,
and deletions from the Uniform Act.
10 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 201(a), 7B U.L.A. 528 (1958) (any person who transacts
business as a broker-dealer as defined in § 401 (c), or as an agent as defined in § 401 (b),

must register with the state administering agency).
II Id. § 301, 7B U.L.A. 550. Section 402 of the Act, however, exempts a number of
securities and transactions from the registration requirements of section 301. Id. § 402,

1988]

BLUE SKY LAWS

operates as an expression of government approval or recommendation of the security,1 2 fail to file disclosures intended for prospective
investors,' 3 or fail to comply with disclosure requirements ordered
by the state administering agency. 14 The Act also imposes liability
upon sellers who offer or sell securities by means of a false statement or an omission of a material fact. 15
The Uniform Securities Act entitles purchasers to recover the
consideration paid for the securities together with interest, costs,
and attorneys' fees, less any income generated by the securities. 16
To recover, purchasers must tender their securities back to the
seller and prove that the seller sold the securities either in violation
of certain provisions of the Act or by means of a misrepresentation
17
of a material fact.
B.

Blue Sky Laws in Jurisdictions Not Following the Uniform
Securities Act

Seventeen states have not adopted the civil liability provisions
of the Uniform Securities Act.' These states impose civil liability
either for all blue sky law violations 19 or for violations of only certain blue sky law provisions. 20 A few states fail to impose any civil
21
liability for blue sky law violations.
7B U.L.A. 599. A seller may thus sell a security without fear of liability if the security or
transaction qualifies for an exemption under section 402.
12 Id. § 405, 7B U.L.A. 622.
13 Id. § 403, 7B U.L.A. 620. If the disclosures pertain to transactions exempted
under section 402, however, the Act does not require the seller to file. Id.
14 Id § 304(d), 7B U.L.A. 565. In addition, section 410(a) imposes liability if the
seller fails to comply with any state escrow or impounding requirements. Id. § 305(g),
7B U.L.A. 567.
15 Id § 410(a)(2), 7B U.L.A. 528. See supra note 9 for the text of § 410(a)(2).
16 UNIF. SECURrIES AcT § 410(a)(2), 7B U.L.A. 528.
17 Id. § 410(a), 7B U.L.A. 643.
18 These states are Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Vermont. See supra note 9. Maine, Nevada, and New Mexico follow
the Uniform Securities Act of 1985. See supra note 7.
19 Six states fall into this category. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20 (1985); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17
(Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1985); S.D. CODIFMED LAwS
ANN. § 47-31-133 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4225 (1984).
20 Eight states fall into this category. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001 (1987);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25501 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-14 (Supp. 1987);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.501 (West Supp. 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:714 (West
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10605 (Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.770
(Michie Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40 (1986).
21 Two states, New York and Rhode Island, do not provide for any civil liability. In
Coastal Fin. Corp. v. Coastal Fin. Corp. of N. Providence, 120 R.I. 317, 387 A.2d 1373
(1978), the court rejected an implied rescission remedy. Id at 325, 387 A.2d at 1378.
See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-11-15, -11-24 (1985) (no mention of rescission remedy-explicit
remedies include only revocation of seller's license, prohibition of sale, and possible
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Six states currently provide for civil liability when a seller fails
to comply with any requirement of their blue sky laws, 22 creating a
cause of action for violations of even the most formal and least important requirements. 23 Commentators have offered several criticisms of these statutes: (1) they place a tremendous burden on
sellers to search thoroughly the often complex blue sky laws and
familiarize themselves with the blue sky laws' technical details; (2)
they frequently allow a purchaser to avoid contracts simply because
the seller failed to comply with a statutory formality; 24 and (3) they
enable sophisticated buyers to take unfair advantage of less-experienced sellers by intentionally entering into sales contracts that contain a formalistic defect, knowing that they can avoid the contracts if
25
the securities decrease in value.
In order to avoid problems created by the imposition of liability
for technical violations, 26 some states have adopted narrower civil
liability provision similar to the Uniform Securities Act, limiting civil
liability to only certain specified violations of the blue sky laws and
27
to situations where a seller commits fraud in selling a security.
Currently, eight states not following the Uniform Securities Act
28
have adopted this type of statute.
Both types of blue sky laws (those that impose liability for any
statutory violation and those that impose liability only for violations
of certain provisions), like the Uniform Securities Act, provide repenal sanctions). The New York Court of Appeals in CPC Int'l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.,
70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987), held that neither New York
statutory law nor the 1933 Securities Act provides a private cause of action. See N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-c (McKinney 1984). See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1014-15 (1983).
Florida falls into none of the categories. Its statute parallels federal securities law
by providing that state civil remedies will match those afforded "by laws of the United
States for the purchasers or sellers of securities." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.241(3) (West
Supp. 1988).
This Note provides no further discussion of the New York, Rhode Island, or Florida
blue sky laws.
22 See supra note 19.
23 For examples of such provisions, see L. Loss & E. COWETr, supra note 2, at 135.
But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20 (1985) (providing an exception for faulty registrations
made in good faith, thus allowing escape from strict liability).
24 "For example, why should a sophisticated buyer be able to recover the purchase
price from the seller when the market generally has gone down just because he later
discovers that the seller filed a required report a day late?" Draftsmen's Comment to
UNIF. SECURITIES AcT § 410(a) (1958), rerinted in L. Loss & E. COWETr, A PROPOSED
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT: FINAL DRAFT AND COMMENTARY 145 (1956).
25 Id.; Note, Voidability Provisions Under State Blue Shy Laws, 17 W. REs. L. REV. 1148,
1150-51 (1966) (authored by Dale LaPorte).
26 See UNIF. SECURITIES AcT § 410(a) (1956) (draftmen's comments), reprinted in L.
Loss & E. COwETr, supra note 24, at 145; Note, supra note 25, at 1154.
27

28

See the statutes cited supra note 20.
See supra note 20.
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scission as the basic remedy. 2 9 Upon tender of the securities, a purchaser generally can recover the purchase price of the securities,
interest, costs, and attorneys' fees, less any income generated by the
0
securities.3
II
THE DEFENSES OF IN PAR1 DELICTO AND ESTOPPEL

Defendants in civil blue sky law actions sometimes plead the defenses of estoppel and in pari delicto, both of which bar recovery
when the purchaser shares culpability with the seller. In pari delicto
generally concerns a purchaser's conduct before or at the time of
the sale.3 1 Estoppel, on the other hand, is a defense created by the
purchaser's culpable conduct after the sale. 32 No blue sky law pro-

vides for these defenses; 3 3 instead, in pari delicto derives from common law, 34 and estoppel has both common law and equity origins. 35
Some states allow in pari delicto or both in pari delicto and estop36
pel, while others permit neither defense.
29

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

30

E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 44-2001 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17

(Supp. 1983). If the purchaser has resold the securities, he can recover damages equal
to the amount recoverable upon tender less the value he received from the sale, plus

interest.
31 See Note, Civil Remedies Available to Buyers Under The Iowa Securities Law, 14 DRAKE
L. REv. 131, 138 (1965) (authored by Arvid Wendland) (defines in pari delicto as "some
degree of participation by the buyer in perpetrating the violation before the sale took
place").
32 Id. at 137 (estoppel is "some degree of participation or acquiescence in the affairs of the issuer by the buyer after the illegal transaction has taken place"). Equitable
estoppel involves reliance by the party asserting estoppel on words or conduct of the
other party. In blue sky law cases, however, courts use the term "estoppel" loosely, and
generally do not require reliance. Estoppel in civil blue sky law actions also includes the
defenses of laches, ratification, and waiver. Cf Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 431
(8th Cir. 1984) (in securities regulation, "ratification by conduct" actually generates an
estoppel defense).
33 Generally, the failure to tender the securities back to the seller, the statute of
limitations, and a showing that the transaction was exempted under the statute are the
only defenses available to sellers under blue sky laws. E.g., UNIF. SECURrrIES AcT

§ 410(a), 7B U.L.A. 643 (tender); § 410(e), 7B U.L.A. 643 (statute of limitations); § 301,
7B U.L.A. 550 (transactions exempted), § 403, 7B U.L.A. 620 (same) (1958). But see
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-19 (Bums 1984) (purchasers not entitled to recover if they
knowingly participated in violation, or if they knew, at time of transaction, that transaction violated blue sky laws).
34 See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301 (1985).
35 See Aclin v. Caplener, 229 Ark. 718, 723, 318 S.W.2d 141, 144 (1958). See also 28
AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel & Waiver § 3 (1966).

36

Many early blue sky laws declared that sales in violation of the statute were either

"void" or "voidable." See L. Loss & E. Cowurr, supra note 2, at 131-33 (discussing
distinction between void and voidable). Generally, courts held that where a sale was
"void," defenses of in pari delicto and estoppel did not apply. See id. at 167-68 and cases
cited therein. On the other hand, if the sale was merely "voidable," these defenses
would apply. See, e.g., Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397
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In Pari Delicto

"In pari delicto" is shorthand for "in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis," a Latin phrase meaning "[i]n a case of equal or mutual
37
fault... the condition of the [defending party] is the better one."
In pari delicto traditionally applies where the plaintiff and the defendant stand equally culpable in the transaction producing the statutory violation. 38 In securities cases, states have generally required
proof of equal fault before allowing in pari delicto to bar an action.
Courts approach "equal fault" in two ways. In the most common
approach, courts attempt to weigh or balance the relative culpabilities of the parties. Less commonly, courts find equal fault when the
purchaser participated in the violation to the extent that the culpable purchaser also violated the blue sky laws and would be liable to
any innocent purchasers. Although courts appear to employ these
two different approaches, no practical difference exists between the
two.
Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co. 3 9 exemplifies the more common
balancing approach in which a court attempts to weigh the relative
culpabilities of the parties. In Moore the plaintiff agreed to invest in
a company only if he received a salary from the corporation and
could participate in its management. After the directors elected the
40
plaintiff treasurer and secretary, the company issued stock to him.
The plaintiff signed his own stock certificates after ample opportunity to make an examination of the company's affairs. 4 ' Later, when
(1953). This distinction no longer holds because the vast majority of statutes do not use
any "void" or "voidable" language. No jurisdiction employs "void" language, only six
employ "voidable" language (Hawaii, Illinois, Ohio, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Vermont), and the Uniform Securities Act uses neither.
37
BIACK's LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979). See also Annotation, Purchaser's
Right to Set up Invalidity of Contractbecause of Violation of State SecuritiesRegulation as Affected by
Doctrines of Estoppel or Pari Delicto, 84 A.L.R.2d 479, 491 (1962).

See Young v. Kwock, 52 Haw. 273, 277, 474 P.2d 285, 288 (1970) ("This defense
38
[of in pari delicto] generally requires that the plaintiff be equally culpable in the transaction producing the defendant's liability."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at
711.
Traditionally, in pari delicto has included a policy prong. Courts have precluded
the defense of in pari delicto where "there may be on the part of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public policy in many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties may be." I J. SToRY, EqUITYJURISPRUDENCE 305 (M. Bigelow
13th ed. 1886) (4th ed. 1846). In blue sky law cases, however, state courts that allow the
defense of in pari delicto do not explicitly address any policy prong.
39
335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953). The Michigan statute at that time declared that " '[e]very sale or contract for sale of any security... made contrary to any
provision of this act, shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser.' " Id. at 609, 56
N.W.2d at 398 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 451.120 (1948)). The court in Moore also
found estoppel. Id. at 611, 56 N.W.2d at 399.
40 Id. at 608, 56 N.W.2d at 398.
41
Id.
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another stockholder brought suit against the company claiming a
violation of the blue sky laws, the company bank account was transferred to the plaintiff's name to avoid attachment. 4 2 Then, after
seven months of employment, the plaintiff brought suit against the
corporation claiming violations of the blue sky laws; he did not leave
his employment, however, until two months later.4 3 The court held
that the plaintiff was in pari delicto ;nd thus disallowed recovery
because the plaintiff signed his own stock certificates, he had full
opportunity to examine the company's affairs, and he was secretary44
treasurer and an active participant in the company's management.
Schvaneveldt v. Noy-Burn Milling & Processing Corp.4 5 provides another example of this balancing approach. The seller in Schvaneveldt
violated Utah's blue sky laws by selling unregistered securities to the
plaintiff,4 6 who knew that the securities were unregistered. In addition, the plaintiff attended meetings at which the incorporation of
the business was discussed, served as the general manager of a
closely related corporation, and encouraged others to buy the corporation's stock.4 7 Despite the plaintiff's knowledge of the blue sky
law violation and his close relationship to the corporation, the Utah
Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was not as culpable as the
sellers, who were officers and directors of the corporation. There48
fore, the defense of in pari delicto failed.
Under the balancing approach, knowledge of a blue sky law violation alone is insufficient to find a purchaser in pari delicto.49
Rather, the purchaser must engage in some type of affirmative action, such as participation in the management of the company at the
time he receives stock. The court in Theye v. Bates,50 for example,
adopted the following rule of in pari delicto: "'Where a purchaser
of stock participates in the organization or management of the corId. at 609, 56 N.W.2d at 398.
Id.
Id. at 611,56N.W.2d at399;seealsoSchrierv. B. &B. Oil Co., 311 Mich. 118, 18
N.W.2d 392 (1945), cited in Moore, 335 Mich. at 610, 56 N.W.2d at 399.
45 10 Utah 2d 1, 347 P.2d 553 (1959).
46
Id. at 3, 347 P.2d at 554.
47 Id.
48
Id. For another close case in which a court found unequal culpability, see Trump
v. Badet, 84 Ariz. 319, 327 P.2d 1001 (1958).
49
See, e.g., Fierer v. Ashe, 142 Ga. App. 290, 292, 235 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1977);
Annotation, supra note 37, at 493 (1962) (and cases cited therein); L. Loss, supra note 4,
at 1677. But see Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (knowledge
alone enough to hold purchaser in pani delicto); Restlawn Memorial Park Ass'n v. Solie,
233 Wis. 425, 432, 289 N.W. 615, 617-18 (1940) (knowledge at time of sale and for
three months afterwards that sale violated blue sky laws because stock not registered
barred purchaser from recovering); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-19 (Bums 1984) (purchaser cannot recover unless he can prove no knowledge of blue sky law violation).
50
166 Ind. App. 652, 337 N.E.2d 837 (1975).
42

43
44
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poration issuing or selling the stock, he may be considered as in pari
delicto with the seller, precluding him from asserting the invalidity
of the contract on the ground that it violates state securities regulations.' "51 The Theye court then barred recovery by the purchasers
because they participated in the incorporation of the company and
52
subsequently served as corporate directors and officers.
The other approach to in pari delicto requires purchaser participation in the violations of the blue sky laws to the extent that the
purchaser would also be liable under the laws. The civil liability
provisions hold certain "nonsellers" as well as sellers liable for violations. 53 These "nonsellers" include officers, directors, partners,
and similar persons. 54 Under this approach to in pari delicto, if the
purchaser violated the blue sky laws as either a seller or nonseller,
then the purchaser is in pari delicto.
The Supreme Court of Georgia applied this approach in Nash v.
Jones.55 In Nash a seller sold unregistered securities to the plaintiff
in violation of Georgia's blue sky laws. 56 The plaintiff was a corporate officer and director at the time of the sale. 57 The court found
that the plaintiff violated the blue sky laws because he was a director
in the corporation at the time of the violation,5 8 making him liable
under the statute to an innocent purchaser. Relying on this finding,
the court held that the plaintiff was in pari delicto and barred his
recovery. 59
Id. at 663, 337 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting Annotation, supra note 37, at 498).
Id. at 664, 337 N.E.2d at 845.
53 Section 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act identifies nonsellers who may be
liable under section 410. Section 410(b) states, in part:
(b) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every
employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also liable . . .
unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to
exist.
UNIF. SECURrrIEs AcT § 410(b), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1958).
51

52

54
55

Id.

56

224 Ga. 372, 162 S.E.2d 392 (1968).
Id. at 373, 162 S.E.2d at 393.

57

Id.

58 Id. at 374-75, 162 S.E.2d at 394. At the time, Georgia law, in part, provided:
"'The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every director,officer, salesman or
agent of or for such seller who shall have participatedor aided in any way in making such sale,
shall be jointly and severally liable.'" Id at 374, 162 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting 1957 Ga.
Laws 161) (emphasis added by court).
59 Id. at 375, 162 S.E.2d at 394; accord Young v. Kwock, 52 Haw. 273, 278, 474 P.2d
285, 288 (1970) ("for to be culpable and, hence, in pari delicto those who aid or participate must be an officer, director or agent of the seller"); see also Stevens v. Crystal Lake
Transp. Sales, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 3d 745, 748, 332 N.E.2d 727, 730-31 (1975) (purchaser
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In practice, the two approaches to in pari delicto differ little because they usually yield the same results. Most purchasers found in
pari delicto under the balancing approach would also be found in
pari delicto under the other approach. In these cases, the purchaser
participated in the management of the company and thus presumably violated the blue sky laws. 60 Thus, no practical difference exists
between the approaches in the majority of cases. Thus, this Note
assumes that a purchaser will not be in pari delicto unless the pur6
chaser violated the blue sky laws. '
B.

Estoppel

Unlike in pari delicto, which applies to a purchaser's conduct
before or at the time of a sale, the defense of estoppel generally bars
a purchaser's recovery when the purchaser participates in or acqui62
esces to the affairs of the seller following a blue sky law violation.
Whether estoppel applies to a plaintiff depends upon the level of
the plaintiff's involvement in the seller's activities. 63 Courts often
consider the following factors in determining whether a purchaser is
estopped: the purchaser's acceptance of dividends or other financial benefits; participation in the management of the corporation;
the purchaser's knowledge of any statutory violations; delay in
bringing an action to rescind after acquiring knowledge of the viola64
tion; and the seller's reliance upon the conduct of the purchaser.
The most important factor for a finding of estoppel is purchaser
participation in the management of the company. 65 For example, in
who was officer and director at time of sale cannot later rescind purchase of stock sold in
violation of blue sky laws); Theye v. Bates, 166 Ind. App. 652, 663-64, 337 N.E.2d 837,
844 (1975) (if purchasers cooperated with sellers in violating laws, recovery barred).
60 But see Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (knowledge alone
enough to hold purchaser in pari delicto); Restlawn Memorial Park Ass'n v. Solie, 233
Wis. 425, 432, 289 N.W. 615, 617-18 (1940) (same).
61
For purposes of this Note's analysis, any use of in pari delicto that violates this
assumption should be considered as the use of estoppel rather than in pari delicto.
62 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
63 Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 291 N.W.2d 896, 908 (Iowa 1980).
64 See id. at 908; Note, A Definition of "Investment Contracts" and EquitableDefenses to Suit
for Rescissionfor NonregistrationUnder the Arkansas SecuritiesAct, 1 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK LJ.
366, 377 (1978) (authored by Anne Ritchey) [hereinafter Note, Investment Contracts] (and
cases cited therein); Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court: 1980, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1063,
1071 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Minnesota Supreme Court] (and cases cited therein). Courts
find estoppel more often when the rights of third parties are involved. See L. Loss, supra
note 4, at 1679-80.
65 Many cases have barred recovery where the plaintiffs participated in the management of the company. See, e.g., Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 434 (8th Cir. 1984)
(participation in management of corporation necessary to finding of estoppel); Krasny v.
Richter, 211 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (participation in management
one method of barring recovery); Goldblum v. Boyd, 341 So. 2d 436, 443 (La. Ct. App.
1976) (participation in company's management a determinative factor); Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 611, 56 N.W.2d 397, 399 (1953) (purchaser was
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Tucker v. McDell's, Inc.,66 the defendant corporation sold fifty shares
67
of stock to an investor in violation of Tennessee's blue sky laws.
The investor subsequently became a director and vice-president of
the corporation. 68 After the corporation failed, and liquidation proceedings began, the investor tendered his stock and asked for rescission. 69 The court held that the purchaser's participation in the
management of the corporation estopped him from rescinding the
purchase, even though his participation occurred after the sale and
70
after the blue sky law violation.
A purchaser's knowledge of a blue sky law violation and delay in
bringing an action to rescind often accompany a purchaser's participation in management. 7 1 For example, in Logan v. Panuska7 2 the
73
plaintiffs knowingly invested in a business with financial problems.
They participated in the business's management and control, and
they took no steps to rescind their purchase until after the business
failed.74 The court concluded that the purchasers' conduct estopped them from asserting a violation of the blue sky laws because
the Minnesota legislature did not enact the blue sky law to protect
investors from their business errors.7 5 The court reasoned that it
would be inequitable to allow the purchasers to force their losses
secretary-treasurer and active in corporation's management); Logan v. Panuska, 293
N.W.2d 359, 363-64 (Minn. 1980) (active participation in management and control of
corporation); Tucker v. McDell's, Inc., 50 Tenn. App. 62, 71, 359 S.W.2d 597, 600
(1961) ("where an investor takes as active a part in the management of a corporation...
as did the plaintiff in this case, his conduct should and does estop him from rescinding
his stock purchase"). One court went so far as to state that "[e]stoppel ...requires that
the stock purchaser directly participate in the management of the issuing corporation or
otherwise exercise some control over the corporation." Henderson v. Hayden, Stone,
Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1972) (interpreting Florida law).
For cases refusing to apply estoppel even though the purchaser participated in the
management of the company, see, e.g., Krutel v. Stolberg, 356 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (participation alone not sufficient); Loewenstein v. Midwestern Inv. Co.,
181 Neb. 547, 149 N.W.2d 512 (1967) (participation must be at sufficiently high level to
trigger estoppel). See also, Note, supra note 31, at 138; Note, supra note 25, at 1170-71.
66 50 Tenn. App. 62, 359 S.W.2d 597 (1961).
67
Id. at 70, 359 S.W.2d at 598.
68

Id.

Id. at 70, 359 S.W.2d at 598-99.
Id. at 71, 359 S.W.2d at 600.
71 See, e.g., De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 708-09, 62 N.W.2d 441,442-43 (1954)
(purchaser estopped from recovering where purchaser involved in management of corporation, had knowledge that purchased securities were sold in violation of blue sky
laws, signed waiver surrendering rights to rescind and acknowledging that securities
were sold in violation of blue sky laws, made second purchase of securities, and waited
until corporation sustained huge loss before bringing rescission action).
293 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1980).
72
73 Id. at 361.
74 Id. at 361-62.
75 Id. at 363-64.
69
70
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76

upon the seller.
Some courts have refused to find estoppel where the purchaser
did not participate in the management of the corporation, even
where other factors, such as knowledge of the violation and receipt
of benefits from the securities, existed.7 7 In Graham v. Kane,7 8 for
example, the plaintiff, seeking a tax shelter, purchased interests in a
limited partnership that he had reason to know were not properly
registered.7 9 This transaction violated the Arkansas blue sky law because the interests qualified as securities. 80 Three years after the
purchase the plaintiff became dissatisfied with his investment and
81
brought an action for rescission, claiming a blue sky law violation.
By the time of the trial, the investment had created total tax savings
of $24,600.82 The court allowed the plaintiff to recover, despite his
tax savings and his knowledge that the interests were not properly
83
registered.
Management participation, however, will not always estop a
purchaser. For example, the court in Krutel v. Stolberg8 4 refused to
find estoppel even though the plaintiff participated in the corporation's management because the level of participation " 'was not to
the substantial extent necessary to make available to the defendants
the doctrine of estoppel.' "85 In Krutel the plaintiff purchased securities in reliance upon the corporation's materially false financial
76 Id. at 364; see also Bond v. Charlson, 374 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1985) (purchasers
estopped from rescinding where they participated in corporation's management, knew
of statutory violation, and delayed in bringing action for rescission).
77
See Hall v. Johnston, 1982-84 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903 (D. Or. 1983),
aff'd, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985) (purchaser not estopped where he knew sale violated
blue sky laws and he received tax benefits from investment); Fierer v. Ashe, 142 Ga.
App. 290, 292, 235 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1977) (knowledge of violations and additional contributions of capital insufficient to establish estoppel); Martin v. Orvis Bros. & Co., 25
Ill. App. 3d 238, 250, 323 N.E.2d 73, 82-83 (1974) (purchaser not estopped from rescinding where he received dividends and tax benefits from shares); see also D.K. Properties, Inc. v. Osborne, 143 Ga. App. 832, 240 S.E.2d 293 (1977) (purchaser not estopped
merely because he was an associate in law firm that provided seller with legal services in
regard to sale of securities).
78
264 Ark. 949, 576 S.W.2d 711 (1979).
79 Id at 950-51, 576 S.W.2d at 712.
80 Id. at 951, 576 S.W.2d at 712.
81

Id

Id.
Id. at 954, 576 S.W.2d at 714.
84
356 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
85 Id at 1301 (quoting trial court judgment). The court listed four essential elements to the estoppel defense: "'(1) That the party to be estopped must know the facts;
(2) that he must intend that his conduct be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) that the latter party must be
ignorant of the true facts; and (4) that he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.' " Id. at 1301 (quoting trial court judgment).
82
83
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statements8 6 and brought suit for rescission after he learned of the
misrepresentations. The court rejected the defendant's estoppel
defense even though the plaintiff became the secretary and treasurer of the corporation after purchasing the securities, had the sole
authority to sign the corporation's checks, and conferred with the
87
other officers on certain business decisions.
Some courts have found estoppel by relying on factors other
than management participation. In In re Racine Auto Tire Co. 8 8 the
court held that estoppel barred the purchasers from rescinding the
stock transaction because they received dividends for over two
years, had exchanged their stock certificates for new ones when the
corporation increased the capital stock, and had participated in
89
stockholder meetings.
C.

Availability of the Defenses

Many courts allow either in pari delicto or both in pari delicto
and estoppel as defenses to civil actions brought under blue sky
laws. 90 Some courts that recognize in pari delicto do not recognize
estoppel, or only recognize it when extreme circumstances exist. 9 1
Courts often permit these defenses in order to prevent the receipt
of inequitable windfalls by purchasers who are not wholly innocent
92
victims in a transaction.
86

Id. at 1300.

87

Id. at 1301.

88

290 F. 939 (7th Cir. 1923).
Id. at 941. See also Farmer's Union Coop. Royalty Co. v. Little, 182 Okla. 178,
180, 77 P.2d 33, 35 (1938) (acceptance of dividends and delay in bringing suit estopped
purchaser from rescinding). In Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974),
the court held that knowledge of the statutory violation alone prevented the purchasers
from rescinding their purchase. Ladd might be more appropriately classified as an in pari
delicto case rather than as an estoppel case because of its use of in pari delicto terminology. The court viewed knowledge of the statutory violation as evidence of the need for
an in pari delicto defense rather than as estoppel. See id. at 668.
90
For examples of courts permitting either defense, see, e.g., Hall v.Johnston, 198284 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985);
Black Point Aggregates, Inc. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 375, 381-82,
10 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1961); Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill. App. 3d 514, 525, 314 N.E.2d
549, 557 (1974); Covert v. Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); Lintz v. Dillon,
568 S.W.2d 147, 151, (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) rev'd on othergrounds, 582 S.W.2d 394 (Tex.
1979).
91 See, e.g., Data Lease Fin. Corp. v. Barad, 291 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1974) (estoppel
only where purchaser is in pari delicto, participates in corporation's management, or
unusual circumstances exist); Allen v. Smith & Medford, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 538, 199
S.E.2d 876 (1973) (estoppel where purchaser engaged in gross misconduct or fraud);
McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1977) (purchaser can rescind contract if
he is not in pari delicto with seller).
92
One court noted that the purpose of the blue sky laws is to protect innocent
purchasers, rather than purchasers who themselves are somewhat culpable. William's
Delight Corp. v. Harris, 87 Mich. App. 202, 273 N.W.2d 911 (1978). Further, the Min89
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In contrast, courts that disallow the defenses reason that the
public policy of maintaining compliance with the blue sky laws out93
weighs any inequitable windfalls received by culpable plaintiffs.
These courts often emphasize the penal purpose of the blue sky
laws, which courts would defeat by allowing the nonstatutory defenses. 94 Some courts refuse to apply estoppel to situations involving an illegal agreement or instrument because to invoke estoppel
would violate an express mandate of the law or the dictates of public
policy.9 5
Dunn v. Bemor Petroleum, Inc.96 demonstrates the concern courts
have for the enforcement of blue sky laws. In Dunn the purchasers
brought an action against the sellers, who sold securities in oil and
gas leases, alleging that the securities were unregistered and thus in
violation of Missouri blue sky laws. 9 7 The sellers raised the defenses
of estoppel and in pari delicto. 9 8 While recognizing that other
states allow the defenses, the court refused to allow them.9 9 The
court stated:
Our blue sky laws were drafted with the intent to prevent
fraud in the sale of securities. It is primarily through civil liability
proceedings that the Missouri Act is enforced. The equitable denesota Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the blue sky laws "is not served by
permitting one who loses his innocence to await the outcome of his investment before
invoking the securities act." Bond v. Charlson, 374 N.W.2d 423, 429 (Minn. 1985).
93 See Black Point Aggregates, Inc. v. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d
375, 381, 10 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1961) ("questions of public policy far beyond the
equities of the immediate parties are involved"); Lintz, v. Dillon, 568 S.W.2d 147, 151
(Tex. Ct. App. 1978) ("Though this result may seem harsh.., this outcome is evidently
the clear intention of the Legislature .... ), rev'd on othergrounds, 582 S.W.2d 394 (Tex.
1979); Hederman v. George, 35 Wash. 2d 357, 362, 212 P.2d 841, 843-44 (1949)
(although unjust and inequitable results may occur by holding for purchaser, "'the law
sustains him in this position, because it takes into account the interests of society and of
the state' ") (quotingJ. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRAcrs § 286 (3d ed.
1926)); see also Edwards v. Trulis, 212 So. 2d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (securities
law was enacted pursuant to police power, and any contract made in violation of it is
void and creates no enforceable rights).
94 See Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill. App. 3d 514, 525, 314 N.E.2d 549, 557 (1974)
("The penal character of the statute negates the utilization of in pari delicto or estoppel
defenses."); Covert v. Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Mo. 1960) (en banc) (estoppel no
defense under Missouri's blue sky laws because it "would tend to nullify and defeat the
very purpose of the statute, which is clearly penal in nature"); see also cases cited supra
note 93.
95 See generally Annotation, supra note 37, at 483-85.

680 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Id at 306.
98 Id The seller contended that the buyers knew the securities were not registered,
and that this knowledge constituted estoppel and in pari delicto. Id. Because knowledge
alone is generally insufficient for a court to invoke estoppel or in pari delicto, proof of
this contention would not result in allowance of the defenses by the court in any event.
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
99 Dunn, 680 S.W.2d at 306-07.
96
97
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fense of estoppel and in pari delicto are not defenses to the liability
created [under our blue sky law]. With such defenses, sellers
could avoid liability under the registration provisions by informing would-be purchasers that the securities were unregistered.
This would defeat the purpose of our blue sky laws.100
The court concluded that the policy of requiring blue sky law compliance outweighs concerns that tainted plaintiffs might receive inequitable windfalls.1 0 1
IV
AN

ANALYSIS OF THE DEFENSES OF IN PARI DELICTO AND
ESTOPPEL

A rule rejecting the defense of estoppel but recognizing the defense of in pari delicto will best achieve the goal of the blue sky laws.
This rule would further the blue sky laws' goal of protecting the
investing public by maximizing compliance with the laws.
A.

The Goals of the Blue Sky Laws

Blue sky laws seek to protect the investing public from fraud
and deception in securities transactions. 10 2 They accomplish this
goal by threatening sellers with civil liability for violations of the
100 Id. at 306 (citation omitted). The Dunn court relied on Covert v. Cross, 331
S.W.2d 576, 585 (Mo. 1960) (en banc) (estoppel no defense under Missouri's blue sky
laws because it "would tend to nullify and defeat the very purpose of the statute, which
is clearly penal in nature").
101
Dunn, 680 S.W.2d at 306.
102
In Fred J. Schwaemmle Constr. Co. v. Department of Commerce, 420 Mich. 66,
77, 360 N.W.2d 141, 145 (1984), the court stated:
The [Michigan blue sky law] was designed to protect the public from
fraud and deception in the issuance, sale, exchange or disposition of securities within this state by requiring the registration of certain securities
and transactions. Its purpose 'is to prevent stockholders and promoters
from perpetrating frauds and impositions on unsuspecting investors in
hazardous undertakings and to protect credulous and incompetent persons from their own inclinations to speculate in hazardous enterprises.'
Id. at 77, 360 N.W.2d at 145-46 (quoting People v. Breckenridge, 81 Mich. App. 6, 1415, 263 N.W.2d 922, 926, cert. denied, 402 Mich. 915 (1978)) (citations omitted). See also
Jenkins v. Dearborn Sec. Corp., 42 Ill. App. 3d 20, 23, 355 N.E.2d 341, 344 (1976)
("The Illinois Securities Act is designed to protect the public not only from fraud and
dishonesty, but also from incompetency, ignorance and irresponsibility of persons engaged in the business of disposing of securities to the public."); Bond v. Charlson, 374
N.W.2d 423, 429 (Minn. 1985) ("The fundamental purpose of 'Blue Sky Laws' is to
protect the investing public from fraudulent sales of securities."); Covert v. Cross, 331
S.W.2d 576, 585 (Mo. 1960) ("The Act was passed to protect investors against their own
weaknesses ....
); Hofer v. General Discount Corp., 86 S.D. 133, 139, 192 N.W.2d 718,
722 (1971) ("statutes governing the registration and sale of securities are remedial in
nature and are designed to protect the unwary buyer"); Pollok v. Commonwealth, 217
Va. 411, 229 S.E.2d 858 (1976)(securities laws are intended to protect investors from
fraudulent sale of securities).
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blue sky laws.' 0 3 Although blue sky laws contain penal provisions,
uneven enforcement and inadequate enforcement budgets make
civil remedies the only effective sanction.' 0 4 As one commentator
noted, "It is largely the threat of civil liability which makes the securities industry so sensitive to the blue sky laws."' 0 5 A rule disallowing the estoppel defense but allowing the in pari delicto defense
would maximize the deterrent effect of such a threat.
Courts that allow the defense of estoppel lessen the blue sky
laws' deterrent value and thus decrease compliance with the laws by
hampering plaintiffs' chances of recovery.' 0 6 Repeated successful
use of the defenses will result in decreased compliance with the
laws. Courts that disallow estoppel, on the other hand, increase deterrence by allowing for more successful suits and creating a "general climate of fear of the statutory civil actions."' 0 7 To the extent
that such courts increase deterrence, they further the primary goal
08
of the laws.
Courts that permit in pari delicto also advance the goals of the
blue sky laws by deterring purchasers from inducing sellers to violate the laws. Because purchasers who are in pari delicto often have
a close relationship with the seller, they are often able to induce
sellers to commit violations. For example, a director might cause or
103 See Hall v.Johnston, 1982-84 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903, at 70,269 (D. Or.
1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985) ("the focus of the civil liability section as it
relates to registration is on forcing sellers to comply with the registration requirements,
rather than scrutinizing the purchaser's conduct"); Comment, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the SecuritiesAct and S.E.C. Rule 10B-5: Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477 (1964) (stating that civil liabilities
sections of the Securities Act of 1933 were designed to "terrorize" issuers into compliance with its requirements).
104 See Hall, 1982-84 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903, at 70,269 ("it is primarily
through civil liability proceedings that the Oregon Securities Law is enforced"); Young
v. Kwock, 52 Haw. 273, 277, 474 P.2d 285, 288 (1970) ("it is the civil liability provisions
and not the criminal section of the Blue Sky Law that generally promote compliance");
L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1631; Note, supra note 25, at 1148; cf COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF AITORNEY GEN., NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., SECURITIES: ATTORNEYS
GENERAL ENFORCEMENT OF BLUE SKY LAwS 18 (1980) (most difficult problems in enforc-

ing blue sky laws is lack of personnel and resources).
105 L. Loss & E. CowE'I-r, supra note 2, at 129-30.
106
See Hall, 1982-84 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903, at 70,269 ("To allow a seller
of unregistered securities to escape liability on the basis of a purchaser's actions would
totally ignore the state's interest in enforcement of the registration provisions."); Young
v. Kwock, 52 Haw. 273, 277, 474 P.2d 285, 288 (1970) ("Because it is the civil liability
provisions ... of the Blue Sky law that generally promote compliance we agree that the
defense of in pari delicto should be carefully limited to those situations where the plaintiff is equally culpable." (footnote omitted)); Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d 359, 364
(Minn. 1980) (ScottJ, dissenting) (estoppel defense "neither serves to compensate the
innocent purchaser nor does it deter future violations of the Blue Sky Law").
107 Comment, supra note 103, at 1483 (analyzing estoppel's effect on actions

brought under sections 11 and 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933).
108

Id. at 1481.
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encourage his corporation to issue securities in violation of the blue
sky laws because the director could then rescind his purchase of the
securities if the value of the securities falls. In effect, he could eliminate the risk of an unprofitable investment.
If, however, the in pari delicto defense prevents directors and
officers from rescinding their purchases, it destroys their incentive
to induce or permit the corporation to violate the blue sky laws. Because the in pari delicto defense removes officers' and directors' 0 9
incentives to induce their corporation to violate the blue sky laws,
the proposed rule furthers the goals of the laws.1 10
Rejecting the estoppel defense also will increase deterrence by
giving notice of blue sky violations to other purchasers. Culpable
plaintiffs are unlikely to sue if the defense of estoppel will apply to
them. Eliminating the estoppel defense is desirable because it will
not discourage such suits. Culpable plaintiffs often stand in the best
position to know of blue sky law violations and their lawsuits will
give notice to innocent purchasers who might not otherwise learn of
the blue sky law violations. Additionally, suits by culpable plaintiffs
will give notice to state officials, who might decide to undertake
state investigations and bring actions against the sellers.",
109 The discussion in this Note applies to all "nonsellers," not just to officers and
directors. See supra note 53 for a discussion of nonsellers.
110 Such action by officers and directors might expose them to personal liability
under the blue sky laws. In some cases this potential liability might sufficiently deter
such a purchaser notwithstanding the in pari delicto defense. Such deterrence will occur
only if several conditions are met: (1) the transaction will significantly involve other purchasers (because the blue sky laws frequently involve very small sales, often to only one
purchaser or group of purchasers, this condition will often not be met); (2) the purchaser knows that he will incur liability to the other purchasers; (3) the purchaser believes that if he sues, the suit will give notice to the other purchasers; and (4) the
potential liability that the purchaser faces will be larger than his profits from the transaction (the purchaser will probably not have to pay all of the damages because he is jointly
liability with the corporation and other officers). The in pari delicto defense, on the
other hand, directly deters purchasers in nearly all cases.
111 Because of minimal enforcement capabilities and inadequate budgets, state
agencies might not otherwise detect the violations. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
In some cases, however, culpable purchasers not in pari delicto will not sue even
though estoppel does not apply, thereby preventing other purchasers and the state from
receiving notice. This will occur if culpable purchasers fear that the suit will give others
notice of other illegal conduct by the culpable purchasers that might subject them to
liability. Such liability, of course, would not include liability for involvement in the original violation itself, because such culpable involvement would occur only if the purchaser was in pari delicto. For example, suppose a broker, Y, sells some of the securities
he bought (which were sold in violation of the blue sky laws) to another person, X. In
addition, Y knew that the securities were unregistered, but did not tell this to X. The
sale by Y to X was fraudulent because Y's failure to notify X was a material misstatement;
thus, Y would be liable to X for fraud. If Y believes that X will learn of the fraudulent
sale if he sues the original seller for the first blue sky law violation, Y might not bring the
action. In this instance, the notice function, although not defeated, will not be furthered
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By giving notice to other purchasers, the proposed rule should
increase the number of successful suits, which will make violations
of the blue sky laws more costly and thus deter violations. This "notice function" will also serve to ensure compensation for all injured
purchasers.
Allowing the in pari delicto defense does not hamper this notice
function. A purchaser who would be subject to the in pari delicto
defense would also be liable to any innocent purchasers for these
violations. Thus, to avoid notice to innocent purchasers and the
chance of suit, a purchaser subject to in pari delicto would not sue
regardless of whether the defense applied.
One major drawback to the proposed rule remains: purchasers
bearing some culpability, but not enough to subject them to the in
pari delicto defense, might receive inequitable windfalls. For example, the rule would allow a tainted purchaser who knows that he
bought securities sold in violation of the blue sky laws to rescind his
purchase if the securities ever decline in value. The proposed rule's
goal of deterring blue sky law violations, however, outweighs any
such inequities.
B.

Statutory Language

By disallowing estoppel, the proposed rule achieves the deterrence goal of the blue sky laws by disallowing estoppel. The majority of blue sky laws, by imposing strict liability, demonstrate that
their primary goal is deterring violations. Under section 410(a) of
the Uniform Securities Act, the plaintiff need only prove that either
the seller did not properly register the security, the seller was not
registered, or that the seller did not give proper disclosure."12 The
purchaser need not prove that the seller's violation caused damages
or that he relied upon the seller not to violate the act. The seller's
even though estoppel is not allowed. Such cases, however, will probably not arise often,
and any resulting impact on the notice function would therefore be minimal.
112 For the text of the statute, see supra note 9. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of a seller's liability. See also Hall v.Johnston, 1982-84 Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903, at 70,269 (D. Or. 1983) (The court interpreted Oregon's blue
sky law, which is patterned after the Uniform Securities Act, and stated "The statute's
language is unambiguous and clear: it says that anyone who violates the registration
requirements is liable, to the extent provided by the statute. The legislature could have
included in the statute a provision allowing equitable defenses to be raised in a civil
liability suit."), aft'd, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985); cf Comment, supra note 103, at 148182 (discussing strict liability language of federal civil liability provisions). This argument
does not extend to section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act. Cf id. at 1478-80
(distinguishing section 12(1) of the 1933 Securities Act, which is similar to section
410(a), from section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, which is similar to section
410(a)(2)).
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intent and knowledge are also irrelevant. 113 The defendant escapes
liability only upon a showing that the statute of limitations period
expired 14 or that the transaction was exempted. 115 By using strictliability language, legislatures demonstrate their intent to deter
noncompliance with the blue sky laws and not merely a desire to
1 16
provide a remedy for injured purchasers.
Two other provisions commonly found in blue sky laws support
the proposed rule. First, "antiwaiver" provisions such as section
410(g) of the Uniform Securities Act1 7 express a legislative desire
to protect all purchasers. Such antiwaiver provisions disallow enforcement of a waiver provision even if the parties agreed to waive
the Act for purposes of their transaction. 1 18
If courts allowed estoppel, the parties could effectively circumvent the antiwaiver rule by having the purchaser participate in the
transaction to an extent that would trigger estoppel. 1 19 Such a
tainted transaction would provide the seller with the same insulation
afforded by a valid waiver. Permitting the in pari delicto defense,
113 But see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-19 (Bums 1984) (defendant's reasonable lack of
knowledge of the violation constitutes defense).
114 See UNIF. SECURrrIES ACT § 410(e), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1958).
115 See supra notes 11 & 13.
116 See Comment, supra note 103, at 1411. Strict liability also plays another role: it
furthers judicial efficiency. The use of estoppel will impair this goal because it creates
more complicated and time consuming litigation, which requires additional proof and
introduces additional issues. Indeed, strict liability encourages settlement because a
guilty seller will know if he is liable and both sides will wish to avoid additional litigation
fees.
117 UNIF. SECURrrIEs ACT § 410(g), 7BU.L.A. 644 (1958). SeeL. Loss, supra note 21,
at 1191 (1983) (antiwaiver provisions should aid person asserting a violation against
arguments of estoppel or ratification); Note, Minnesota Supreme Court, supra note 64, at
1071 n. 13 (waiver clause could be interpreted to exclude implied waiver or ratification).
The Uniform Securities Act of 1985 did not adopt an antiwaiver provision, and the
comments to the act do not explain this omission.
118
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this act or any rule or order hereunder
is void." UNIF. SECURITMEs ACT § 4 1 0(g), 7B U.L.A. 644 (1958).
But see Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co., 428 F. Supp. 818 (D. Conn. 1977)
(suggesting that antiwaiver rule may not apply to conduct after sale).
119 See Dunn v. Bemor Petroleum, Inc., 680 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(The court disallowed the defense of estoppel because "[w]ith such defenses, sellers
could avoid liability under the registration provisions by informing would-be purchasers
that the securities were unregistered. This would defeat the purpose of our blue sky
laws."); see also Hall v. Johnston, 1982-84 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,903, at 70,269
(D. Or. 1983) ("if defendants could escape liability under the registration provisions
simply by informing would-be purchasers that the securities to be purchased were unregistered, defendants could essentially write the registration provisions out of the Oregon Securities Law"), aft'd, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985); Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d
359, 364 (Minn. 1980) (Scott, J., dissenting) (allowance of estoppel "could prompt
clever promoters of questionable investments to ignore the Blue Sky regulations and,
instead, encourage an investor to participate in the management of the company so that
an estoppel defense could later be established").
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however, would not circumvent the antiwaiver rule in most instances
because the purchaser would have to expose himself to liability to
other purchasers in order for a seller to have a valid in pari delicto
defense. A purchaser would likely not agree to such an
arrangement.
This argument is much weaker for the fourteen states whose
statutes do not include antiwaiver provisions. 120 The lack of an antiwaiver provision could arguably empower courts to allow waiver
and related defenses where equity requires. 12 1 The absence of antiwaiver provisions in these states, however, does not weaken the
other arguments in favor of restricting defenses to blue sky law
violations.
The second common provision, the statute of limitations for
civil blue sky law actions, implicitly supports the proposal that
courts should not permit an estoppel defense. A number of cases
considered the plaintiff's delay in bringing an action important in
permitting an estoppel defense. 12 2 Using a plaintiff's delay in
bringing suit to prevent him from recovering, however, conflicts
with the statute of limitations provisions. By enacting short statute
of limitations periods, legislatures decided the time limits (delays)
that should bar plaintiffs from recovering. 23 Courts that bar a
,plaintiff's recovery on the ground that a plaintiff's delay estops him
120
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Vermont do not have antiwaiver provisions in their blue sky laws. This argument is especially weak in Oregon,
which adopted parts of the civil liability provisions of the Uniform Securities Act but not
section 410(g) (presumably considering but rejecting the antiwaiver provision).
121
See L. Loss & E. Cow=ar, supra note 2, at 174-75 (antiwaiver provision should aid
person asserting a violation against defense of estoppel as well as waiver).
122
See, e.g., Krutel v. Stolberg, 356 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(discussing cases where plaintiff delayed too long to rescind); Walton v. Semmler, 6
Mich. App. 596, 149 N.W.2d 885 (1967) (purchaser who did not attempt to repudiate
until sued fell outside the scope of the act); Bond v. Charlson, 374 N.W.2d 423, 429
(Minn. 1985) ("the purpose of the act is not served by permitting one who loses his
innocence to await the outcome of his investment before invoking the securities act");
Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 1980) (purchasers did not attempt to
rescind until business failed); see also Note, Investment Contracts, supra note 64, at 378-79
(discussing defense of laches). The defense of "laches" refers to neglect by the defendant to assert a right which, with a lapse of time and other circumstances disadvantaging
the defendant, bars the action. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 787. In the
context of blue sky laws, laches is typically included within the meaning of estoppel. See
supra note 32.
123 The Uniform Securities Act section 410(e) provides for a two year limitations
period. UNIF. SECURITIEs Acr § 410(c), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1958). Statutes of limitations
are commonly used to argue against the use of laches, especially when the period is
short. See Comment, supra note 103, at 1485-86. But see Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co., 428 F. Supp. 818, 828-29 (D. Conn. 1977) (Connecticut, Uniform Securities Act
jurisdiction, has two-year statute of limitations period that does not abrogate rule requiring purchaser to give prompt notice of intention to rescind).
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from recovering violate this legislative judgment.12 4
CONCLUSION

The defenses of in pari delicto and estoppel often arise in actions brought under the civil liability provisions of state blue sky
laws. Courts are split on whether they should allow such defenses.
This Note proposes a rule prohibiting estoppel but allowing in pari
delicto. This rule maximizes compliance with the blue sky laws and
therefore furthers the goal of these laws-the protection of the investing public. The statutory langauge of many blue sky laws supports this proposed rule. Thus, by adopting this rule, courts will
further the legislative intent to protect the public.
Charles G. Stinner

124
Although not relying on the statute of limitations, another argument against using delay as a reason for authorizing estoppel is that " '[i]t would not be expected of
anyone that he would elect to treat a sale of stock as void until he had discovered it was
not profitable for him to retain it.'" L. Loss, supra note 4, at 1677 (quoting Bunge v.
Kirchoff, 251 Ill. App. 119, 126 (1928)).

